Despite all the talk in Washington about balanced budgets and smaller government, one federal agency has seen its funding increase 71 percent over the last two years: the Immigration and Naturalization Service. In addition, Congress appears likely to give the INS substantial new powers and responsibilities when it considers several immigration bills this spring. Yet these reforms are doomed to fail and added resources are doomed to be wasted because they ignore a fundamental problem: the inherently flawed federal immigration bureaucracy. Immigration reforms will not work if they assume that the INS can effectively handle large new assignments.

Efforts to reduce illegal immigration are especially problematic, as proposals in Congress would vastly increase the INS's responsibilities. They would require employers to clear all hiring decisions through a computerized worker registry and give the agency thousands of new investigators and Border Patrol agents. These proposals will fail to work because the legislation does not address INS mismanagement, the root cause of the agency's spectacular failure to control illegal immigration over the past two decades. Short-term reforms would significantly improve the performance of the immigration bureaucracy. Several specific duties which the INS currently mishandles could be privatized, and structural changes in INS enforcement programs and its organization chart would help improve performance.

But only comprehensive reforms can truly fix the immigration bureaucracy. Lawmakers should abolish the INS and separate its two basic functions. Legal immigration and naturalization should be administered by a newly-created Federal Immigration Agency. Law enforcement functions, including the Border Patrol, should be turned over to the Customs Service.

Introduction

The United States has entered an era of smaller government. Recent budget negotiations reflect a consensus across political lines that the budgets and the responsibilities of federal agencies should be scaled back.

One federal agency is a notable exception to this general rule. The Clinton Administration, with the support of Congress, has increased this agency’s budget by 71 percent in two years. The agency is experiencing "almost an embarrassment of riches."1 Moreover, legislation expected to reach the floor in both the Senate and House this spring would give this agency dramatic new powers. It would be logical to assume that this agency is one of the government’s most effective and trusted bureaucracies.

But Washington has a way of turning logic on its head. The agency which is about to receive unprecedented increases in funding and responsibility is one of the least effective and most ridiculed bureaucracies in the nation’s history: the Immigration and Naturalization Service. In every decade since the 1940s, commissions and oversight committees have proposed major reforms in the federal immigration bureaucracy.2 In 1981, the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy described the INS as "among the most beleaguered agencies in the federal government."3 In 1986, the House Judiciary Committee characterized the INS as "undermanned, ill-equipped, and generally overwhelmed."4 In 1990, a Congressional commission concluded that "Reorganization of the current structure ... is urgently needed."5 In 1994, an investigative series in the New York Times concluded that the INS is "perhaps the most troubled major agency in the federal government," and "broadly dysfunctional."6 In March 1995, Congressman Harold Rogers (R.-Ky.) charged that the INS is "the most inept, badly managed federal agency that we have." Rogers concluded that the INS "needs [deep reform] more than any agency I’ve ever seen."7 Warren Leiden, executive director of the American Immigration Lawyers Association, laments, "The INS needs elementary strategic management. It is so lacking, it is overwhelming."8 Frank Sharry of the National Immigration Forum says that the INS has "traditionally been one of the most demoralized and least effective federal bureaucracies—and that’s saying a lot."9

Years of mismanagement have resulted in mind-boggling failures:

• Deportation. Several million immigrants currently living in this country should be deported (having entered the United States illegally or violated the terms of their visas). Of these, an estimated 200,000 have been convicted of criminal acts while in this country. Yet the INS deports only about 40,000 people every year. The New York Times reports that "the Immigration and Naturalization Service conducts most deportations on an honor system. It mails deportees notices asking them to turn themselves in on a given day. But so few surrender that deportation officers sarcastically refer to the notice as a ‘run letter.’ In New York, about 96 percent of those receiving the letter run."10
  
• Asylum policies. Because of a weak review process, by 1995 there was a backlog of 450,000 asylum applications. Statistics show that, if the applications were ever reviewed, the vast majority would be dismissed as frivolous. Rather than dealing with these applications, the INS grants hundreds of thousands of work permits to the applicants while the agency sits on the paperwork. The Clinton Administration created new regulations and recently congratulated itself for "dramatic success" in streamlining the system. The Administration’s definition of "dramatic success," however, is questionable: the backlog has actually increased by over 10,000 applications. In effect, the INS is satisfied to give a free pass to hundreds of thousands of people who have no right to be in the U.S.11
  
• Information systems. In 1993, several states asked the INS to verify the legal status of 3.6 million people who had applied for various welfare benefits. About 18 percent of the people, approximately 650,000, appeared to be illegal aliens because they were not listed in INS computer records. But the states pushed for more information and ultimately discovered that almost every one of them was here legally.12
  
• Illegal immigration. The INS is responsible for enforcing employer sanctions, which prohibit companies from hiring illegal immigrants. By September 1994, 36,000 leads on possible violations had yet to be investigated.13

The chronic ineffectiveness of the federal immigration bureaucracy is a primary cause of the nation’s loss of confidence in its immigration laws. Yet all of the major immigration reform proposals ignore the overwhelming case for bureaucratic reform. Although management strategies and organization charts do not usually grab headlines, no piece of immigration reform is more needed. Without comprehensive structural reform of the federal immigration bureaucracy, billions of dollars in new spending on immigration will be wasted and new responsibilities will go unfulfilled.

This Policy Brief describes the federal immigration bureaucracy and the major immigration reform proposals, identifies the structural problems in the INS and other federal agencies responsible for administering the nation’s immigration laws, exposes the Clinton Administration’s "reinventing government" sham, and proposes comprehensive reforms of the federal immigration bureaucracy.

The Immigration Bureaucracy

The first federal immigration authority was created in 1891 — the Superintendent of Immigration, under the Treasury Department. From 1913 to 1940 the agency was a part of the Labor Department, but since then the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) has been a division of the Department of Justice.14 The INS now has over 21,000 employees, approximately 20 percent of all people employed by the Justice Department and 10,000 more people than it employed in 1986.15 The INS operates 62 offices in the United States and three offices overseas.16 In Fiscal Year 1995, the INS budget was $2.1 billion — twice its budget in FY 1990.17 Fiscal Year 1996 has brought the INS another 25 percent increase in its budget, to $2.6 billion, and by FY 1997 INS’s workforce will have exploded to 25,000 people.18

The INS serves two functions. It is an enforcement agency: the Border Patrol’s 4,800 agents are primarily responsible for preventing illegal immigrants from entering the country, while the Investigations Division, a separate INS enforcement division, is primarily responsible for tracking down illegal immigrants who are already in the country.19 The Detention and Deportation Division is responsible for deporting illegal immigrants.

The INS is also a service agency, responsible for facilitating legal immigration and naturalization. INS examiners handle applications from U.S. companies that want to import foreign workers, or from U.S. citizens and permanent residents who want to bring in a family member. In FY 1994, the INS handled applications from over four million people or companies applying for some type of immigration benefit.20

The federal immigration bureaucracy is not limited to the INS; thousands of other federal workers are dedicated solely to immigration-related functions. Foreign Service officers in the State Department issue visas at all embassies and consulates around the world, and the Bureau of Consular Affairs directs their efforts from Washington. Before many employment-based visas are issued, Department of Labor employees must study the labor market and certify that a foreign worker is necessary for the position. The Department of Health and Human Services distributes funds for refugee programs.

Current Reform Proposals

The country’s current political sentiment has prompted dozens of immigration reform proposals, at both the state and federal levels. All of these reform proposals assume an effective and efficient federal immigration bureaucracy. Reform proposals invariably give the INS more tasks, more authority, and a bigger budget, as if the INS could deal with immigration-related problems if it were only given more resources. Several examples are illustrative:

• The Clinton Administration, with the support of Congress, has given the INS a $500 million increase in its budget. In the last two years, the Administration has increased the INS budget by 71 percent.21 The assumption is that the INS will be able to effectively use these vast increases in its budget.
  
• The primary House legislation, H.R. 2022, would require the Border Patrol to have 10,000 agents in place by the year 2000, more than doubling its size.22 The primary Senate legislation, S.1394, would require the Border Patrol to have 8,500 agents on the payroll by the turn of the century.23 These requirements assume that the INS will be able to effectively recruit, train and deploy these legions of new agents without major problems.
  
• California’s Proposition 187 and similar referenda now being placed on state ballots around the country would require hospitals, social workers, and law enforcement officers to report to the INS any person who appears to be an illegal immigrant. These referenda assume that the INS will be able to use these tens of thousands of new leads to catch and deport illegal immigrants.
  
• The Clinton Administration, H.R. 2022, and S.1394 all would make the INS responsible for administering a vast computer network which would verify the employment eligibility of all workers. The House and Senate bills would require the INS to link its computer systems with the Social Security Administration and approve every hiring decision made in the United States by private employers. Americans change jobs or enter the workforce 65 million times each year, and this new computer network would have to approve each one of these changes. Proponents assume that the INS computer systems are accurate and sophisticated enough to handle this task. They also assume that the INS would be able to quickly perform "secondary verification," which occurs when the information in a computer file is not sufficient to resolve the question. According to one study, the initial computer response is ambiguous 28 percent of the time. Yet the bills assume that within ten days of each initial inquiry, INS headquarters could locate, retrieve, and analyze a hard copy of each file which needs secondary verification. 24
  
• H.R. 2202 and S. 1394 would require the INS and the Department of Labor to hire several hundred additional investigators to scrutinize whether employers are hiring illegal immigrants.25 These requirements assume that the INS and DOL have a plan to deploy these investigators effectively.
  
• On the assumption that immigrant workers come to this country under false pretenses and often displace American workers, S. 1394 would require that certain categories of immigrant workers report to a local INS office after they have been in the country for two years so that they can be scrutinized a second time and the INS can examine payroll documents to ensure that they are being payed the proper salary. The bill would also expand the use of "labor certification," the process by which the Labor Department certifies that no U.S. worker is available for a particular job. S. 1394 assumes that INS and DOL offices can handle tens of thousands of additional interviews each year.26
  
• In his 1996 State of the Union message, President Clinton unveiled his latest proposal for controlling illegal immigration: an executive order prohibiting companies found liable for knowingly hiring illegal immigrants from ever bidding on government contracts. The executive order assumes that the INS will effectively investigate federal contractors and report the results of its investigations to other government agencies.

None of the major immigration reform proposals call for any reform in the federal immigration bureaucracy. Indeed, all proceed on the assumption that the INS can handle vast new responsibilities with no significant changes. Ignoring the need for bureaucratic reform ensures the failure of any immigration policy. As Warren Leiden of the American Immigration Lawyers Association says, "Congress passes these laws but it doesn’t make any difference if you have an agency that isn’t successful. Conversely, if you have a successful agency, you wouldn’t need many of these new laws."27

The Flaws in the System

It is important to recognize that the INS has thousands of dedicated and talented employees. For example, its Forensic Document Laboratory is state-of-the-art — it even helped identify the bones of Nazi doctor Joseph Mengele several years ago. The INS also has many talented law enforcement officers, experts in business immigration issues, and trial lawyers who work to deport criminal aliens. Some district offices are lead by innovative managers. The INS has a model "service center" process, under which certain types of common applications are handled by regional service centers so that district offices can be freed up for other work.

However, the inherent deficiencies in the federal immigration bureaucracy ensure that current immigration laws cannot be administered effectively — to say nothing of new ones. The agency’s leadership and the structure of the federal bureaucracy unintentionally create a haven for poor performance, and even the best employees are eventually dragged down by the institution’s culture of failure.

The INS, as well as other federal agencies that administer our immigration laws, suffers from crippling fragmentation, abysmal service, chaotic enforcement, negligent financial management, counterproductive duplication at the border, and costly duplication in admitting immigrants. Cumulatively, these problems have created a devastating culture of failure.

Crippling Fragmentation

The most visible INS official is the commissioner. The Clinton Administration appointed Doris Meissner, a noted immigration expert who is polished in dealing with Congress and the media. The importance of the commissioner, however, can be overstated; the nuts-and-bolts work of the agency takes place in 33 district offices and four service centers. In these 37 offices, decisions are made each day on tens of thousands of applications for immigration benefits. Unfortunately, the INS performs more like 37 separate bureaucracies than an integrated agency. Former INS General Counsel Raymond Momboisse complained in an internal memorandum that the INS is "a feudal state with each region, district, and sector acting independently to give its own interpretation to the law."28 The New York Times concluded that "the agency’s 33 district directors run fiefs. They make their own rules, often quite different from one place to the next, and set the tone."29

Three examples illustrate that even on the most basic issues, the INS is not an integrated unit. First, although ruling on petitions for immigration benefits is the bread and butter of the agency, immigration examiners have very limited direction from INS headquarters on interpreting the law. Immigration examiners are supposed to have other sources to help them interpret the often arcane and confusing language in immigration laws, including implementing regulations, the "Examinations Handbook" and "Operating Instructions" written by INS headquarters, and administrative and court decisions which interpret the law. However, the INS admits that its regulations are so out of date that some "simply don’t make sense or need revising," according to a senior INS official.30 The Examinations Handbook and the Operating Instructions are so far out of date that examiners rarely bother to consult them. And the INS has no index of the thousands of court decisions interpreting immigration law, so examiners only rely on the cases they recall from memory. Naturally, it is not unusual for identical forms filed in two different locations to receive two different responses.

Immigrants are well aware that if they are unsuccessful in crossing a U.S. border today, they are likely to get a different answer tomorrow when a new INS inspector is on duty. In many situations, U.S. immigration policy depends more on the person you ask than on the rule of law. It is difficult to argue with the U.S. citizen who compared the INS to third-world governments he had encountered. The INS procedures he confronted were "no less repulsive than the various forms of unofficial corruption I witnessed for years in Africa and the Middle East," he said.31

A second example is the enforcement wing of the INS. In certain parts of the country, INS enforcement teams focus their investigations on companies notorious for hiring illegal immigrants, while in other regions the goal is to penalize as many companies as possible. In the West and South particularly, the INS offices have a significant number of cases involving only technical paperwork violations rather than deliberate efforts to employ illegal immigrants. An Alabama company that negligently filled out employment eligibility verification forms on new employees might be fined tens of thousands of dollars, while an Ohio company that made the same mistakes might just be given a warning. One study showed that in Miami, San Antonio, and Houston, Border Patrol agents and other INS investigators deliberately did not coordinate their activities. Even when the situation only called for people sitting in the same building to talk to one another, "there was no rational division of the territory and no systematic referral process for leads, much less common targeting, fine or settlement standards."32 The authors of the study, Paul Hill and Michael Fix, concluded that "extreme levels of variation across regions and districts give rise to abiding questions of consistency and fairness."33

Management practices also vary widely from district to district. Outstanding ideas implemented in one district are rarely adopted by other districts, and outstanding failures are rarely flagged so that others will avoid the same problems. Discussing a serious case of corruption in one INS office, the New York Times reported, "Even the agency’s senior managers were largely unaware of the case and its lessons. And the immigration service has still done almost nothing to avert similar problems in other offices."34

Why do the district offices operate as disconnected fiefdoms? One reason is that the INS’s organization structure cripples effective communication. Instead of having a direct line between Washington and the field offices, the INS has inserted "regional offices" into the organization chart. District offices do not report to Washington; they report to one of three regional offices, which report to Washington. The INS is the only agency in the Department of Justice which has regional offices between its Washington headquarters and its field offices.35 With a significant bureaucracy between Washington and the people who actually carry out the work, communication naturally breaks down. It takes exceptional effort to ensure that a policy decision in Washington is communicated to employees in district offices, and a herculean effort for employees in a district office to get Washington’s ear.

INS’s culture is also a barrier to uniform policy. Over the decades, Washington managers have developed their own culture, divorced from the realities of life in the field. Chronic mismanagement from Washington has left many INS employees openly hostile to the agency’s headquarters, and most of the rest simply neglect to maintain contact. This breakdown in communication worsens almost every one of the INS’s other problems. A.D. Moyers, district director of the important Chicago office, said that at one point he had not spoken to his supervisor in Washington for two and a half years. Patrick Kane, recently the acting district director of the Phoenix office, said, "You feel like the Lone Ranger out here, you’re so out of touch."36

One academic concluded that the INS has declined "into a series of segmented, autonomous units."37 Congress simply cannot assume that when it passes a new law, the INS will implement it in a consistent and rational manner. The agency must overcome its fragmented organizational structure and culture before it can effectively enforce the nation’s immigration laws.

Abysmal Service

The INS was created, in large part, to rule on applications for visas and to administer an effective naturalization process. Over four million applications are filed with the INS each year, and each applicant must pay a fee. For example, when an American company wants to hire a foreign scientist who has a wife and two children, the INS charges it $535.38 In 1995, the INS earned $685 million from these fees.

Operating a significant part of the agency on user fees is a good idea, and the $685 million in revenue makes the INS comparable to a very substantial corporation. However, a private company that treated its customers as the INS does would soon be bankrupt. The New York Times reported that "at INS offices throughout the country, telephones go unanswered, mail goes unopened, and immigrants stand in day long lines that often lead them to surly, untrained workers who cannot answer their questions."39 The District Director of the San Francisco office said, "It’s crazy. People are paying good money to get service from the government, and we’re not giving it."40

A Soviet refugee complained, "The INS is completely like a Soviet bureaucracy[.] Every sign starts with the word ‘no’: No smoking. No standing. No sitting. No asking questions. You cannot reach a human being by phone. And when you go, you stand for many humiliating hours in line only to reach a semi-human who answers your measly question by talking in a cabalistic language: ‘I-95, dash, point 6, dash, B-52.’ "41 Chicago District Director A.D. Moyer lamented, "A lot of people have gone out of their way to make this a cold, rude, insensitive and inefficient agency[.]"42

Inadequate resources cannot explain the shoddy service. INS expenditures doubled between 1986 and 1989, but processing times for applications did not move an inch.43 Abysmal service is better explained by two factors: first, the INS leaves most contact with the public to untrained and poorly paid clerks. The New York Times concluded that "the INS mishandles far more cases than its share because the agency is organized in a way that allows some barely trained employees to bark at the clients, turn a deaf ear to their complaints or mishandle their requests."44

The second factor behind abysmal service is the law enforcement mentality adopted throughout the agency. The INS is supposed to provide a "service"— processing the paperwork for qualified immigrants get into the country to work or be reunited with their families, and to help naturalize immigrants. It is also supposed to be a law enforcement agency, arresting and deporting illegal immigrants. In practice, these two missions are "quite different, almost opposite, organizational objectives," according to the General Accounting Office.45

In the daily battle between these "opposite organizational objectives," the enforcement mentality almost always wins. Grover Joseph Rees, INS General Counsel during the Bush Administration, writes, "For too many INS officials, the answer is easy: we are the Anti-Immigration and Naturalization Service, and we are about keeping people out. Although critics of the INS frequently characterize it as a ‘schizophrenic agency,’ torn between contradictory missions of ‘service’ and ‘enforcement’, from the inside it seldom looked like a tough choice."46 Westin Kosova, writing in The New Republic, argues that "in its zeal to catch every illegal, the INS regards everyone on the other side with suspicion. To the service, a legal immigrant is merely an illegal alien with papers."47

The enforcement mentality is taught at the INS’s training centers. Moreover, INS gives high regard to experience with enforcement, so many management positions on the service side of INS are filled by people with enforcement backgrounds. Warren Leiden of the American Immigration Lawyer’s Association said, "The reward for being really good at enforcement is a promotion to examinations management, where the majority of the job is administering benefits. Excellence in one is very different from excellence in the other."48

The tension between the service and enforcement functions of the INS is not only seen in the miserable experiences of immigrants and American companies who have to deal with the agency’s rudeness and inefficiency. The Ascencio Commission, a blue-ribbon panel established by Congress, issued a report in 1990 that listed five other problems resulting from the service/enforcement conflict:

• Competition for resources within the agency
  
• Lack of coordination and cooperation between enforcement and service programs
  
• Conflict between district offices and Border Patrol sectors
  
• Personnel practices which encourage employees to move between enforcement and service jobs
  
• Confusion among employees regarding their mission and which responsibilities should be given highest priority.49

The Ascencio Commission concluded: "Some attribute INS’ management and operations problems directly to its dual responsibilities."50

Bennett Lee’s conclusion should be heeded: "If immigrants cannot be effectively served by the INS, the entire viability of the agency must be questioned."51 Until more motivated people are responsible for contact with the public, and until the INS’s service and law enforcement functions are separated, abysmal service will continue.

Chaotic Enforcement

Although the INS’s original purpose was to administer the legal immigration process, controlling illegal immigration has emerged as an important responsibility over the past two decades. Nonetheless, the INS has been spectacularly ineffective in controlling illegal immigration. By the middle of the 1980s, so many illegal immigrants were living and working in this country that Congress unilaterally declared approximately three million undocumented people to be legal residents. The "amnesty" was only a temporary "solution," however. The most reliable estimates indicate that between three and four million illegal immigrants live in the United States, and two to three hundred thousand people join them each year.

There are many reasons why people immigrate to this country without legal permission. The best long-term solution is for the United States to aggressively export democratic capitalism to Latin America and Asia. Since this goal raises issues that governments generally prefer to avoid, the focus will remain on the immigration service’s ability to control U.S. borders. The INS has been a spectacular failure in this regard for three reasons.

Reason #1: Lack of coordination

The agency’s enforcement unit has two primary branches: the Border Patrol and the Investigations Division. Theoretically, the Border Patrol intercepts illegal entrants at or near the border while the Investigations Division carries out INS’s enforcement work in the interior of the country (searching for undocumented immigrants at their places of work, participating in drug smuggling investigations, and investigating alien smuggling rings, among other things).52 Both border control and interior enforcement are necessary because about one-half of illegal immigrants enter the country by crossing the border illegally and the other half by entering the country legally and staying longer than their visas allow.

Unfortunately, the Investigations Division and the Border Patrol do not run on the same track. INS district offices have jurisdiction over "districts," and the Investigations Division operates its law enforcement functions in those districts. Border Patrol agents, on the other hand, work in "sectors." The 21 sectors, however, have no relationship to the 33 districts — sectors often overlap two or more districts. While investigators report to a district director, Border Patrol agents report to a sector chief. One researcher concluded, "The task of coordinating district offices and sectors is made inherently difficult by overlapping boundaries; for example, the San Antonio district includes parts of the Del Rio, Laredo, and McAllen sectors. The involvement of two separate units in sanctions created confusion, competition, and uneven enforcement policies, despite the signing of memoranda of understanding between district offices and Border Patrol sectors to divide the country."53

Perhaps these structural problems could be overcome through diligent cooperation. However, the investigators and the Border Patrol agents are quite antagonistic toward one another.54 The lack of communication is so poor that in one case Border Patrol agents stumbled into an Investigations Division covert operation.55

Moreover, the neat division of responsibilities between the two units has eroded. In the mid-1980s, Border Patrol management decided that it wanted a hand in more high-profile work and began to divert its agents to help with cases involving, for example, drug smuggling. The Border Patrol became so involved in narcotics trafficking and other work that it opened offices in places like Grand Rapids, Michigan, which is over 300 hundred miles from the Canadian border, and Miami, Oklahoma, which is closer to Kansas City than Mexico. A General Accounting Office study found that between 1986 and 1990, although the Border Patrol received substantial increases in resources, the amount of time Border Patrol agents spent patrolling the border actually dropped by 11 percent.56 Moreover, the expansion of the Border Patrol has crippled the Investigations Division. With the Border Patrol doing their work, many investigators have been reduced to shuffling paper. One study concluded that 57 percent of an INS investigator’s work does not require any enforcement skills.57

The Clinton Administration recently released a plan confirming that the Border Patrol will be diverted to duties other than controlling the border, including drug smuggling investigations.58 Therefore, the enforcement divisions at INS will continue to be fragmented.

Reason #2: Lack of strategy at the border

Despite all of the publicity and press releases on the subject, the INS does not have a comprehensive strategy for controlling illegal immigration. When representatives in Congress say that they want to give 10,000 Border Patrol agents to the INS, they are simply pulling a number out of the air. Congress has never received a report which says that the Patrol could adequately keep watch of the border if it had 5,000 agents, 7,500 agents, 10,000 agents, or any other number. In the absence of a thoughtful, comprehensive strategy, the agency just fumbles along. In 1993, a new sector chief took over in El Paso, Texas. For years, the Border Patrol had emphasized apprehensions — meaning that agents patrolled the city’s streets and surrounding rural areas in order to catch illegal immigrants after they crossed the border. The new chief, Silvestre Reyes, decided to implement a strategy emphasizing prevention rather than apprehensions. "Operation Hold the Line" saturated the border with agents, had them stand shoulder to shoulder, and hoped to convince illegal immigrants that it would be futile to attempt to cross. Reyes received substantial opposition from INS headquarters, but when he eventually implemented the new strategy illegal immigration plunged and the operation was celebrated in the media and Congress.

Once the El Paso strategy began to prevent illegal immigration, one would expect the Border Patrol to have immediately implemented it in Southern California as well. However, it took the Clinton Administration almost two years to implement a similar prevention strategy in the San Diego area, and the Border Patrol still had no plans in place at that time to deal with high-traffic areas Arizona and New Mexico.

The flow of illegal immigration is like a balloon; if you press it in one area it expands in another. "The news got around pretty quickly that we were a weak spot on the border," Arizona Border Patrol Officer Kevin Oaks told the Washington Post. "It should have been no big surprise when they started coming across here."59 "The movement eastward has occurred faster than I had predicted," INS planning official Robert Bach admitted.60 The most eastern counties of California have also been complaining: "If the goal of Gatekeeper [the code name for the San Diego operation] was to simply shift the problem to the east, it has been a success," an East County, California, Board of Supervisors member told the San Diego Union-Tribune.61

Now the problem has come full circle. "For all its touted success," the Dallas Morning News reported, "one big drawback of Hold the Line is discontent among Border Patrol Agents." "[S]pending the day sitting behind a fence on the river bank" is mind-numbing work, making the agents anxious to return to the old strategy emphasizing arrests.62 The agents also feel they are trapped because without a significant number of arrests on their records, the operation is "a career killer."63 Because the Border Patrol is such a narrow agency, its officers do not have diverse professional opportunities. Agents in El Paso see nothing but years of sitting on a chair in the sun.

The El Paso story shows that Border Patrol management did not develop the strategy, opposed it when it was proposed, failed to implement it when it was successful, negligently refused to address other border areas, and now have no idea how to make the strategy work on a long-term basis. It is no wonder that the Border Patrol attrition rate has been as high as 30 percent per year.64

It is clear that the root problem has been mismanagement, not a shortage of Border Patrol agents. Currently pending legislation only addresses the secondary problem — the number of agents — without addressing the root problem. Bennett Lee argues, "In time, adding personnel to a malformed system will only aggravate and accentuate the existing problems."65

Congress should not allocate a single additional dollar until the INS presents a comprehensive strategy for successfully controlling the border. An anonymous senior INS official told the Washington Post, "After you clamp down in El Paso and San Diego, you have to do Nogales and then the next place and the next. You’ll just keep adding resources like you’re escalating a military operation without knowing what it will take to win."

Reason #3: Disastrous workplace enforcement strategies

In 1986, Congress passed the Immigration Reform and Control Act, requiring companies to complete government forms on all new hires. The theory is that by completing the forms companies will be able to identify illegal immigrants. The Clinton Administration is pursuing employer sanctions with vigor, arguing that well-paying jobs are the primary magnet drawing illegal immigrants.

However, the INS has long left its regional offices and district offices to implement their own strategies for enforcing employer sanctions. As noted earlier, researchers Michael Fix and Paul Hill discovered that enforcement strategies were completely different, even contradictory, in different areas of the country. Another study reported, "In many of the sites in this study, district office enforcement priorities seemed to be shaped by the preferences of individual managers instead of by a large agency strategy."66

The Clinton Administration has put its imprint on employer sanctions by adding an enforcement tool it claims will help fight illegal immigration. Everyone concedes that employer sanctions have been undermined by the easy availability of fake employment eligibility documents, such as Social Security cards and birth certificates. The Clinton Administration has therefore decided to add "telephone verification" to the employer sanctions regime. The Administration plans to offer companies the opportunity to access INS databases; every time a company wants to hire a person who identifies himself as an immigrant, it can call the INS for verification that the person is included in the agency’s database of authorized workers.

The problem is obvious: the plan will only catch illegal immigrants who, although they know that their identification numbers will be checked against government computer databases, will admit that they are immigrants. Since false birth certificates and Social Security cards are available in abundance, illegal immigrants can avoid the entire system by purchasing these cards and claiming to be U.S. citizens. Thus, hundreds of millions of dollars and countless man-hours will be wasted on a system that is guaranteed to fail.

The primary House and Senate reform bills deal with this problem by requiring that all new employees, citizen and non-citizen alike, be verified as eligible to work. The bills require the INS and the Social Security Administration (SSA) to tie their computer databases together, and compel companies to contact these agencies to obtain an authorization code from the new computer database before they hire any new employee.

All efforts to make employer sanctions work are colossal wastes of taxpayer money, even with a compulsory nationwide computer registry program. Assuming that the new computer database helps employers identify illegal immigrants, it still will not slow illegal immigration because of the abscence of a deportation program. INS deports only a tiny fraction of people who are eligible for deportation, and almost all of these are illegal immigrants who are already in prison for committing other crimes.67 So an undocumented worker who loses a job will merely move on to another company, which may or may not discover he has fraudulent papers. If he fools the computer, he has a job; if he doesn’t, he at least has a job for a month or so. In a month, a farm worker can complete the current harvest and then move on to another farm to harvest another crop. The revolving door never stops because illegal immigrants are rarely removed from this country. Moreover, the computer databases are so flawed that millions of people will be falsely identified as illegal immigrants when in fact they are U.S. citizens or authorized immigrants. According to a 1989 Justice Department audit, the information in the INS database is incorrect or missing 17 percent of the time. Since the INS will soon have files on approximately 50 million people, the files on between five and ten million people will contain serious errors. The SSA’s database is plagued by similar inaccuracies, meaning that millions of Americans will be wrongly tagged as illegal immigrants, causing them to lose their jobs. Proponents argue this will not happen because the INS and SSA can retrieve a person’s file and double-check computer results. But the INS cannot even find millions of files, let alone locate, retrieve, and analyze them quickly. The Reagan and Bush Administrations rejected proposals to establish a national computer database, arguing that the federal government is already too intrusive on both companies and individuals.68

In 1989, the INS devoted 28 percent of its resources to enforce the employer sanctions law.69 Its efforts have failed because the strategy has too many holes to fill: fraudulent documents, inaccurate INS computer records, and no deportation program. If the agency would divert that portion of its resources to beefing up its deportations program, there would be a dramatic improvement in the war against illegal immigration. In addition to increasing the number of illegal immigrants who are removed from this country, a stronger deportations program would deter others from entering the country in the first place.

The enforcement chaos demonstrates that the current bureaucracy is inherently incapable of performing one of its chief functions. As Bennett Lee has written, "if these programs cannot operate effectively and in an efficient manner, then the INS becomes an operation of questionable utility."70

Negligent Financial Management

Approximately one-third of the INS budget comes from fees. Although the agency assumes large fee accounts when making its budget projections, it often fails to actually collect the fees. Reports show that the agency negligently allows tens of millions of dollars to slip through its hands.

For example, people who travel into the country by air or sea are required to pay a fee of approximately $6. Airlines and cruise ships add the charge to each ticket and are then supposed to send the money to the INS. However, the agency rarely contacts the airlines or cruise lines to recover the money. The net loss to the agency is staggering: $23 million per year, according to an internal DOJ report. Kenneth Rath, the INS’s senior financial official, said, "I can’t say that’s wrong because I don’t know. But there are only two people down there monitoring this in accounting."71

Bail bonds for deportation hearings are another source of uncollected income. Many immigrants who are arrested and placed in deportation proceedings post a bond so that they can be released while waiting for a hearing. Since over 90 percent of illegal immigrants fail to appear for deportation hearings, hundreds of thousands of bail bonds are forfeited.72 All the agency needs to do is contact the bonding agent to collect the fees. However, those simple calls are rarely made and collection letters are rarely sent. Net loss to the agency: $38 million over six years, according to the Justice Department. "We don’t have anybody assigned to that," the director of the San Francisco office admitted.73

How can an agency that operates under chronic budget crises fail to make simple collection efforts? "This kind of thing goes on year after year, but nobody’s ever held accountable," the former director of the Phoenix office has said.74 If the INS were a private business, managers would be held responsible for bottom-line issues like collecting revenue. Moreover, employees would be given profit-sharing incentives to make sure the accounts receivable are kept low. Of course, the Clinton Administration claims to have solved these problems through its "reinventing government" initiative. Kenneth Rath, the senior official responsible for financial matters, told the New York Times that he had carefully studied each critical audit and implemented procedures to solve the problems. "But around the country other INS officials laughed at that. They noted that about the time Mr. Rath made the remark this summer [1994], his office announced that the agency was once again $60 million short. That led to the annual rite of midyear budget cuts in every office."75 Two years into the Clinton Administration, the Office of Management and Budget classified the INS’s financial controls as "high risk."76 Until basic free market principles are applied to the INS, financial mismanagement will continue to cost the agency millions.

Counterproductive Duplication at the Border

Customs and INS inspectors work at each major port of entry into the United States. Customs inspectors, employees of the Treasury Department, are generally responsible for examining goods entering the country, while INS inspectors are responsible for examining people entering the country. When an inspector approaches a car, however, the neat distinctions are difficult to maintain. For example, a Customs inspector will ask for identification and may check the person’s name against the national criminal computer files, as well as questioning the driver about any goods he is carrying. INS inspectors may also question a driver about agricultural products he is carrying, as well as his immigration status. Inspectors from these two agencies work side-by-side, interpreting and applying each other’s laws.

Unfortunately, "Customs and INS have a long history of interagency rivalry," according to a 1993 General Accounting Office report.77 "[T]hese unproductive conditions are deeply ingrained in the management cultures of these agencies."78 The GAO documented remarkable examples of this hostility, including an incident in 1992 when INS officials at the Laredo port decided to use drug-sniffing dogs to help their inspectors make narcotics arrests. When Customs officials learned of the INS initiative, the officials hustled their own drug-sniffing dogs in order to "minimize opportunities for the INS special operation to make drug seizures," according to the GAO.79 Mexican border guards must have been puzzled as they watched teams of Customs and INS dogs flood the small bridge into Laredo, competing with one another for the opportunity to sniff at cars sitting in the lines. At some point it must have been clear that the dogs and inspectors were snarling more at one another than at potential drug smugglers. When the GAO confronted Customs officials, they protested that drug-sniffing dogs are "the sole prerogative of Customs"; the INS should have left its dogs in the kennels.

This is not an isolated incident. "The operational problems along the southwestern border are real, have persisted for many years, and are deeply rooted in the culture of the two agencies," the GAO concluded.80 Among the GAO’s findings:

• There is no cross-training between Customs and INS officers;
  
• Planning by the two agencies is separate;
  
• The agencies compete to commission reports showing which agency’s inspectors are working harder;
  
• There are no joint staff meetings; and,
  
• There are two separate hierarchies — each port of entry has two conflicting leaders. Ports do not have one official who is in charge of port operations.81

Perhaps most distressing is that this duplication costs the government tens of millions of dollars.82 "There is a terrible waste of resources between the INS and Customs," former Customs Service Director William Von Raab says.83 The GAO’s conclusion was that INS and Customs cannot co-exist: "All past studies indicate that a lasting solution to inspection coordination problems at land border crossings will not be reached until the current dual management structure is eliminated."84

Costly Duplication in Admitting Immigrants

To be granted permission to enter this country, most immigrants must satisfy two federal agencies. First, a person or company must file forms with the INS proving that the immigrant is qualified under the immigration laws. If the INS grants the petition, it sends a cable to the United States embassy where the immigrant lives. However, the embassy does more than just complete the paperwork — it reviews the entire process all over again. The "consular officer," an employee of the State Department’s Foreign Service, has the authority to veto INS’s action, and his decision cannot be appealed. Both the INS and the consular officers work from the same basic text — the Immigration and Nationality Act. However, the State Department has its own regulations interpreting the Act, called the Foreign Affairs Manual. Therefore, when an immigrant seeks permission to enter the country, he must convince two different agencies operating on two different sets of regulations to let him in.

Naturally, the State Department has also created a bureaucracy to oversee its programs. The Bureau of Consular Affairs gives training to consular officers, writes the Foreign Affairs Manual, and represents the State Department in Washington’s immigration policy debates.

The INS/State Department duplication creates a double bureaucracy where one would be more than enough. President Truman established a commission to study immigration in the early 1950s, and it concluded, "The best available information indicates that this costly, unwieldy and unbusiness-like duplication serves no reasonable purpose. It is hardly more than historical accident which has become, to some, a principle."85

Because the State Department is so powerful and the INS so inept, reform has never been taken seriously. The irony is that this duplication could easily be avoided. Canada and Australia both have their immigration agencies make all immigration decisions. Canadian and Australian immigration agencies have offices in all of their countries’ embassies, working with the foreign service but as employees of the immigration agency.

The last 40 years of wasteful spending only go to prove the Truman Commission’s 1953 conclusion: "In the Commission’s opinion, the duplication in visa issuance and immigration examinations is wasteful and unjustifiable."86

A Culture of Failure

In September 1995, an official of the Carnegie Endowment testified before Congress that "the INS institutional culture ... has developed an unenviable record for arbitrariness, intrusiveness, and resistance to change."87

In light of the problems with the federal immigration bureaucracy, it is no surprise that the INS has developed a negative "institutional culture." INS employees daily confront obstacles that even the most talented individual hesitates to scale. Missing files, uncollected fees, in-fighting with other INS offices and federal agencies, constant demands for information, and confused instructions from headquarters are a daily reality. One agent from San Francisco said, "There’s overwhelming apathy from top to bottom." A former auditor said, "I tell you, 90 days over there, and you don’t know whether to laugh or to cry."88 Perhaps this institutional culture is the single most difficult obstacle to serious improvements in the INS.

Clinton Administration Reforms Have Failed

"President Clinton is starting a revolution in government[.] It will fundamentally change the way government works," Vice President Al Gore announced in September 1993.89 Judging from press releases, the Administration plans to use the INS as a poster child for its "National Performance Review," better known as the "reinventing government" initiative. In a 1994 report, the Administration declared, "Following the precepts of the National Performance Review, INS recently initiated sweeping organizational reform to address these longstanding problems and reinvent the agency."90 The Administration’s "sweeping organizational reform" consisted of:

• Appointing an immigration expert, Doris Meissner, to occupy the agency’s most visible position;
  
• Rearranging the top dozen or so jobs;
  
• Issuing a "Strategic Plan" that consisted of "a rehash of ideas that have been floated around the agency for at least a decade";91 and,
  
• Declaring victory.

Deputy INS Commissioner Chris Sale told a House subcommittee that "the INS is no longer a poorly funded, understaffed, relatively unknown agency with an uncertain mission ... [but] a well-managed agency able to provide the leadership required to curb illegal immigration while maintaining our nation’s proud heritage of legal immigration."92 Outside observers are not as enthusiastic about the Administration’s success. In a March 1995 hearing before a House appropriations subcommittee, Congressman Harold Rogers (R-Ky) stated that he was "just not satisfied that [the INS is] capable of spending [the projected new funds] wisely. I think you’re making some improvement. That’s not saying a hell of a lot." According to the trade journal Interpreter Releases, Congressman Rogers "complained of his years of frustration, and said that even though there appears to be progress, he is ‘very pessimistic and cynical’ because the INS says things about making improvements, but ‘nothing ever happens.’ "93 Interpreter Releases also noted that others in the House are concerned that "the agency is forever on the brink of positive change, but never quite achieves the goal."94 According to Warren Leiden, Executive Director of the American Immigration Lawyers Association, the INS under Meissner "has improved, but they really, really need a total overhaul."95 Frank Sharry of the National Immigration Forum says that the reinventing government initiative has hardly scratched the surface: "The Service has a talented management team, on top of a bubble filled with demoralized, poorly trained and badly managed staff." He characterizes the reforms as "baby steps in a marathon."96

INS employees know better than anyone that the Administration’s press releases are nonsense. According to the New York Times, "Many of the agency’s own employees, interviewed in roundtable discussions at district offices across the country, openly ridiculed some of the agency’s efforts to service its clients. And almost without exception, the employees said nothing had improved for them since Bill Clinton took office — in client service or any of the agency’s other fields of responsibility."97

The Administration has in fact changed very little about the INS, other than improving its public relations effort. Employee morale is as low as ever. Immigrants are still treated shabbily. Customs inspectors and INS officers continue to view each other with suspicion. Other federal agencies are wasting millions by duplicating INS’s jobs. A fragmented, disjointed enforcement division continues to allow hundreds of thousands of illegal immigrants into the country. Tens of millions of dollars in fees remain uncollected. The inescapable fact is that the federal immigration bureaucracy’s problems are inherent — middling reforms will not reverse the course.

Proposals for Reform

The Clinton Administration claims that incrementalism is the answer to the INS’s long-standing problems. However, incremental reforms have been and will be insufficient to correct an inherently flawed agency. Milton Morris, a Brookings Institution scholar who studied the immigration bureaucracy in the 1980s, wrote, "Reform of the immigration bureaucracy must be comprehensive if it is to bring about significant improvement in the administration of immigration policy."98

Service: The Federal Immigration Agency

The Immigration and Naturalization Service must be divided into two agencies, one devoted to administering immigration services and one devoted to law enforcement.

The service agency could be called the Federal Immigration Agency (FIA) and be given authority to reverse decades of costly and counterproductive duplication. The FIA would:

• Assume all of INS’s current service functions, including adjudicating petitions for immigration benefits and processing naturalization applications. All petitions to enter the country permanently or temporarily would be filed with the FIA, including petitions for refugee status and asylum.
  
• Assume all of the State Department’s immigration functions — the Bureau of Consular Affairs would be eliminated. In Australia and Canada, the foreign service leaves immigration matters to the immigration agencies. Australian and Canadian embassies have no role in immigration matters, other than ensuring that immigration agencies are provided with offices.99 Following those models, the FIA would be responsible for decisions on immigration petitions from beginning to end, and would conduct its affairs from an office in each U.S. embassy.
  
• Assume all of the Labor Department’s immigration functions. American companies must now ask the DOL to certify that no U.S. worker is available to perform a job before a foreign worker can be imported, and then file another petition with the INS. Warren Leiden, Executive Director of the American Immigration Law Association, says that the Labor Department "is an extremely flawed agency that doesn’t know what it’s about. DOL’s understanding of the labor market and employment practices seems frozen in time — from the 1950s."100 The FIA would handle immigration petitions from beginning to end.

Giving all immigration duties to one agency would present significant advantages. First, the FIA would save the taxpayers tens of millions of dollars. Under the FIA, hundreds of Department of Labor and Department of State jobs would be eliminated. Duplicative regulations, including the Foreign Affairs Manual, would be eliminated. An integrated service agency will "permit the elimination of costly, overlapping and redundant operations," according to the Ascencio Commission, a Congressionally-mandated study group which recommended in 1990 that the INS be divided into two agencies.101 The 1953 Truman Commission also argued that the State Department’s role in admitting immigrants be eliminated, replaced by immigration service officers working out of offices in all embassies. The Commission’s recommendations over 40 years ago still resonate: "The time has come to terminate the unnecessary and costly obstructions established by the duplication of visa and immigration examinations. This could be accomplished by eliminating overlapping and duplication through unifying these functions in a single process. The result will be a more effective administration of the law, a saving of Government expenditures and a better location of administrative responsibility."102

Second, the FIA would also produce a more fair and consistent immigration policy. With both the State Department and INS evaluating immigration applications, and with both the Labor Department and INS involved in employment-based immigration, decisions are fragmented and often made according to completely different standards. Putting these functions under one agency, with employees trained according to one set of rules, will produce a more cohesive policy. As the Ascencio Commission noted, unifying all service functions in one agency would "provide the basis for developing a more professional corps of officers and policymakers."103

Third, service to immigrants, U.S. citizens, and American companies would improve under the FIA. Since the FIA’s employees would be divorced from enforcement activities, they would not be inculcated with the deep suspicion of immigrants that now prevails at the INS.

Fourth, dramatically reorganizing the federal immigration bureaucracy would eliminate the "fiefdoms" which have developed in various INS districts throughout the country. Dramatic reforms would instill an entirely new institutional culture as innovative programs were adopted. The reorganization would spur communications as INS employees are drawn into the effort. Moreover, a new, more effective organizational chart would be developed, eliminating the regional offices.

Finally, the FIA could give the country more effective long-term planning on immigration policy. The INS "lurches from one immigration emergency to the next," according to the New York Times.104 The Ascencio Commission argued that a lack of long-term planning invites crises: "The continued absence of an effective policymaking (and emergency response) mechanism will increase the likelihood that the United States will not be prepared for the equivalent of another boatlift or another similarly significant migration emergency."105 The new Federal Immigration Agency should put into place a credible policy analysis team with the mission of flagging potential immigration crises and outlining possible solutions.

Enforcement: Merging With the Customs Service

All INS enforcement functions — the Border Patrol, Investigations, Deportations, and inspections — along with the Customs Service’s inspections duties, must be unified under a single agency. Some have proposed creating an entirely new law enforcement agency.106 However, the most practical solution would be for the Customs Service to incorporate all INS law enforcement functions, becoming responsible for monitoring the flow of people as well as goods. The Customs Service would be responsible for all law enforcement issues that immigration raises, including controlling the border, locating illegal immigrants who have settled in the United States, and deporting illegal immigrants. This proposal has been endorsed by the Customs Service, as well as the National Treasury Employees Union.107

The Customs Service is the best law enforcement agency to absorb immigration functions for two reasons. First, it is intimately familiar with the border and its inspectors already have some basic understanding of immigration laws. Second, it is one of the most diverse law enforcement agencies in the government, responsible for enforcing laws administered by 40 other government agencies, including the Food and Drug Administration, the Department of Agriculture, and the Fish and Wildlife Service.108 It also plays a significant role in narcotics interdiction, which is one of this country’s top priorities.

Integrating all immigration enforcement under the Customs Service would present significant advantages. First, it would save taxpayers tens of millions of dollars. Customs currently employs 6,000 inspectors, and INS another 4,000 inspectors.109 If even 2,000 positions could be eliminated, taxpayers would save at least $100 million. And that is only the beginning. "There would be enourmous savings from any rational consolidation," says William Von Raab, director of the Customs Service under President Reagan. "Savings will just fall off the shelves, whether it is computers, supplies, resources, everything."110 Performance along the border would also dramatically improve because debilitating hostility between Customs and INS inspectors would be eliminated.

Second, integrating immigration enforcement into the Customs Service would eliminate the crippling fragmentation in INS’s current enforcement efforts. The fragmentation between the Investigations Division and the Border Patrol is clear, not only because they operate in conflicting geographical areas ("sectors" versus "districts") but also because they report to different bosses. This fragmentation naturally results in a lack of coordination, seriously undermining the agency’s efforts to control unwanted immigration.

Third, turning enforcement over to Customs would present immigration officers with diverse opportunities for service. Police departments have different divisions (narcotics, homicide, property crimes, and street patrols, among others) which all report to a chief of police. This organizational system is wise because beat cops can be promoted and transferred to a specialty of their choice, and detectives can be promoted or transferred to other areas of interest. Border Patrol agents in El Paso are grumbling because the prevention strategy that has proven so effective is also miserable duty. If all immigration law enforcement functions were integrated into a single agency, officers would have greater opportunity for diverse and challenging duties.

Finally, creating a new law enforcement agency would be a catalyst for producing a comprehensive strategy to control illegal immigration. The current structure will never produce such a strategy because the competing INS divisions cannot agree and other federal agencies with responsibilities along the border, especially the Customs Service, are not included in the discussions.

Short Term Reforms

These comprehensive reforms would take at least two years to develop. Moreover, powerful unions, special interests, and congressional oversight committees may prevent these reforms from ever being implemented. Therefore, a series of short term reforms should be implemented.

Privatizing Experiments

John O’Leary and Bill Eggers argue in their 1995 book, Revolution at the Roots, "Competition isn’t foolproof. Political pitfalls, corruption, poor communication and other problems can occur ... But the track record of privatization has shown that it successfully boosts productivity like no other public-sector management tool."111 The INS is an ideal laboratory for experimenting with privatization. With 33 district offices operating largely independent of each other, the INS can field-test dramatic new approaches. Four privatizing experiments should be implemented:

• To improve the collection of millions of dollars in fees that are currently forfeited, the INS should order 11 districts to privatize their fee collections. The offices should give private contractors authority to collect fees, perhaps awarding the companies a certain percentage of fees they collect. Another 11 districts should be instructed to implement profit sharing, allowing employees to share a percentage of new revenues that they can collect. The final 11 districts would maintain the status quo to serve as a control group.
  
• Privatization could serve as a catalyst to improve communications with members of the public. Eleven district offices should contract with companies that would prescreen applicants, ensuring that their forms are properly completed and the applicants have all the necessary paperwork. The contractors would be judged on their ability to deliver more prepared applicants, which would save the INS a tremendous number of man-hours. Another 11 districts could contract with companies that would operate the waiting areas at the district office. The contractors would be judged on their ability to improve gate-keeping functions: providing basic immigration information to walk-in customers, minimizing waiting times and providing more humane service. The other 11 districts would again serve as a control group.
  
• Private companies should be invited to submit proposals to develop a national telephone system which would dispense information to members of the public. The INS could save millions by eliminating its notorious 800 number, "Ask Immigration," along with the hundreds of bureaucrats who work on that failed system.
  
• To improve communications within the INS, a contractor should be hired to develop and maintain an accurate internal phone list of all INS employees, and to develop programs to spur internal communications.

Enforcement

The INS’s ability to minimize illegal immigration could be significantly improved in three ways:

• Eliminate Border Patrol sectors; make the Border Patrol work on the same districts that govern the rest of INS. There would be immediate improvements in communication and coordination between the Border Patrol and the rest of the agency.
  
• A comprehensive enforcement strategy should be presented to Congress within six months, including a specific explanation of the number of Border Patrol agents needed to adequately patrol each district.
  
• All resources currently invested in enforcing employer sanctions, including the development of a massive national computer database, should be diverted to improving the deportation system. Locating illegal immigrants through employer sanctions enforcement is useless because the people are simply released back into the community. By diverting the hundreds of millions of dollars and man-hours invested in employer sanctions, the deportation system could be dramatically improved.

Consistency

Regional offices should be eliminated so that INS headquarters can communicate directly with its field offices. By eliminating regional offices, the INS would be adopting the organization chart used by the FBI, DEA and all other Justice Department agencies. The INS should also make it a top priority to update its Operating Instructions and Examinations Handbook so that the agency develops a consistent national position on the most important issues in immigration policy.

Culture

To confront the INS’s culture of apathy and failure, all INS employees should be given a financial incentive in the agency’s success. Just as in many private companies, the Commissioner should immediately institute a program that welcomes suggestions for improvement, and employees should receive bonuses for any suggestions that are adopted. While a culture of failure inbred in 20,000 people cannot be reversed overnight, seeking their meaningful involvement in making improvements would demonstrate a new attitude from the headquarters.

Conclusion

In every decade since the 1940s, dramatic structural reforms in the federal immigration bureaucracy have been proposed. Reform efforts have been stymied because unions and bureaucrats oppose reforms, and Congress has not been willing to invest the time to see the project through. Recently, however, Washington has been occupied by reformists who have shown a willingness to undertake innovative new projects. It is finally time to dramatically reform the bureaucracy and restore public confidence in our nation’s immigration laws.

Author’s Note

The author wishes to acknowledge the Donations, both to this report and to government service, of his father, a retired INS and Customs Service employee. From first-hand experience, the author knows that the INS employs thousands of dedicated people who want nothing more than to rid the agency of the mismanagement that hinders them.

ENDNOTES

1. "INS GROWS IN TIME OF DOWNSIZING," WASHINGTON POST, DECEMBER 11, 1995.

2. "COMMISSION URGES MORE TRADE, CONSOLIDATION OF IMMIGRATION FUNCTIONS," INTERPRETER RELEASES, JUNE 18, 1990 AT 665.

3. JASON JUFFRAS, IMPACT OF THE IMMIGRATION REFORM AND CONTROL ACT ON THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE AT 5 (RAND CORP. AND URBAN INSTITUTE PRESS, 1991).

4. ID.

5. "UNAUTHORIZED MIGRATION: AN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT RESPONSE," REPORT OF THE COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND COOPERATIVE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AT 29 (1990)(HEREAFTER, "ASCENCIO COMMISSION").

6. "CHAOS AT THE GATES: AT IMMIGRATION, DISARRAY AND DEFEAT," NEW YORK TIMES, SEPTEMBER 11, 1994 AT A1.

7. "INS TAKES IT ON THE CHIN AT WIDE-RANGING HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING," INTERPRETER RELEASES, APRIL 10, 1995 AT 495.

8. INTERVIEW WITH AUTHOR, JANUARY 5, 1996.

9. INTERVIEW WITH AUTHOR, JANUARY 5, 1996.

10. "CHAOS AT THE GATES: POROUS DEPORTATION SYSTEM GIVES CRIMINALS LITTLE TO FEAR," NEW YORK TIMES, SEPTEMBER 13, 1994 AT B9.

11. "INS OFFICIALS HIGHLIGHT REFORMS IN ASYLUM, REDUCTION IN FRAUD," WASHINGTON POST, JANUARY 5, 1996 AT A2.

12. "CHAOS AT THE GATES: AN INSIDER’S VIEW OF THE INS: ‘COLD, RUDE AND INSENSITIVE’," NEW YORK TIMES, SEPTEMBER 15, 1994 AT A1.

13. WASHINGTON POST, FEBRUARY 2, 1995.

14. "WHOM SHALL WE WELCOME," REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION AT 127-128 (1953).

15. NEW YORK TIMES, SEPTEMBER 11, 1994 AT A24; WASHINGTON POST, DECEMBER 11, 1995.

16. "IMPLEMENTATION OF FIELD OFFICE STRUCTURE WITHIN THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE," 60 FED. REG. 57165 (NOV. 14, 1995).

17. "CONGRESS CLEARS APPROPRIATION BILL BOOSTING IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT," INTERPRETER RELEASES, AUGUST 29, 1994 AT 1141; "CONGRESS APPROVES FUNDING FOR INS, STATE DEPARTMENT," INTERPRETER RELEASES, OCTOBER 29, 1990 AT 1215.

18. "FY 1996 IMMIGRATION BUDGET UPDATE," IMMIGRATION LAW REPORT, MARCH 1, 1995 AT 63; "PORK-BARREL POLITICS CLOUDS INS OUTLOOK," WASHINGTON POST, JANUARY 2, 1996 AT A13; "SUPERVISOR TRAINING MAY SUFFER IN HIRING PUSH, INS PANEL SAYS," HOUSTON CHRONICLE, OCTOBER 27, 1995 AT 12A.

19. "SUPERVISOR TRAINING MAY SUFFER IN HIRING PUSH, INS PANEL SAYS," HOUSTON CHRONICLE, OCT. 27, 1995 AT 12A.

20. "INS WORKLOAD STATISTICS FY 1994," IMMIGRATION LAW REPORT, MARCH 1, 1995 AT 64.

21. "FY 1996 IMMIGRATION BUDGET UPDATE," IMMIGRATION LAW REPORT, MARCH 1, 1995 AT 63.

22. SECTION 101 OF H.R. 2202.

23. SECTION 101 OF S.1394.

24. SECTION 403 OF H.R. 2202 AND SECTIONS 111-120A OF S. 1394. SEE J. MILLER AND S. MOORE, "A NATIONAL ID SYSTEM: BIG BROTHER’S SOLUTION TO ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION," CATO INSTITUTE (SEPTEMBER 7, 1995); D. SUTHERLAND, "COMPUTER REGISTRY TO FIGHT ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION: BAD NEWS FOR EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYEES," ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE INSTITUTION (APRIL 1995).

25. SECTIONS 121, 401, AND 402 OF H.R. 2202, SECTIONS 101 AND 102 OF S. 1394.

26. SECTION 303 OF S. 1394.

27. INTERVIEW WITH AUTHOR, JANUARY 5, 1996.

28. QUOTED IN WESTIN KOSOVA, "THE INS MESS," THE NEW REPUBLIC, APRIL 13, 1992 AT 21.

29. NEW YORK TIMES, SEPTEMBER 15, 1995 AT A18.

30. "INS BEGINS PROJECT TO REVISE REGULATIONS, REQUESTS PUBLIC COMMENTS," INTERPRETER RELEASES, NOVEMBER 20, 1995 AT 1572.

31. ROBERT D. KAPLAN, "FRONTIER JUSTICE," THE NEW REPUBLIC, APRIL 13, 1992 AT 24.

32. MICHAEL FIX AND PAUL HILL, ENFORCING EMPLOYER SANCTIONS: CHALLENGES AND STRATEGIES AT 103 (RAND CORP. AND URBAN INSTITUTE PRESS, 1990).

33. ID. AT 145.

34. "CHAOS AT THE GATES: IN IMMIGRATION BABYRINTH, CORRUPTION COMES EASILY," NEW YORK TIMES, SEPTEMBER 12, 1994 AT B10.

35. JUFFRAS AT 2.

36. NEW YORK TIMES, SEPTEMBER 11, 1995 AT A24.

37. BENNETT J. LEE, "THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE: IN SEARCH OF THE NECESSARY EFFICIENCY," 6 GEORGETOWN IMMIGRATION LAW JOURNAL 519 (1992)(HEREAFTER, "LEE").

38. THE $535 FIGURE ASSUMES THE FOLLOWING: AN I-140, PETITIONING FOR PERMANENT RESIDENCE FOR A SKILLED WORKER, $75; I-485, PETITIONING FOR THE SCIENTIST TO "ADJUST STATUS" FROM A STUDENT TO A PERMANENT RESIDENT, $130; PETITIONING FOR HIS WIFE, $130; PETITIONING FOR HIS CHILDREN, $100 APIECE. IF THE SCIENTIST NEEDS A TEMPORARY WORK PERMIT BECAUSE THE INS IS BACKLOGGED, HE MUST PAY AN ADDITIONAL $70. IF HE NEEDS TO TRAVEL OVERSEAS DURING THE SEVERAL MONTHS THAT THE PROCESS TAKES, HE MUST PAY ANOTHER $70.

39. NEW YORK TIMES, SEPTEMBER 11, 1995 AT A24.

40. NEW YORK TIMES, SEPTEMBER 15, 1995 AT A1.

41. NEW YORK TIMES, SEPTEMBER 15, 1995 AT A18.

42. ID.

43. STATEMENT OF HENRY R. WRAY, DIRECTOR, ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE ISSUES, "MAKING NEEDED POLICY AND MANAGEMENT DECISIONS ON IMMIGRATION ISSUES," GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MARCH 30, 1993 AT 6 (MARCH 30, 1993)(HEREAFTER, "GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WRAY STATEMENT").

44. NEW YORK TIMES, SEPTEMBER 15, 1995 AT A18.

45. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WRAY STATEMENT AT 1.

46. GROVER JOSEPH REES, III, "ADVICE FOR THE NEW INS COMMISSIONER," INTERPRETER RELEASES, NOVEMBER 22, 1993 AT 1534.

47. THE NEW REPUBLIC, APRIL 13, 1992 AT 23.

48. INTERVIEW WITH AUTHOR, JANUARY 5, 1996.

49. ASCENCIO COMMISSION AT 30.

50. ID.

51. LEE AT 543.

52. LEE AT 522.

53. JUFFRAS AT 29.

54. FIX AND HILL AT 103.

55. LEE AT 529.

56. LEE AT 524, N. 27.

57. LEE AT 524.

58. "IMPLEMENTATION OF FIELD OFFICE STRUCTURE WITHIN THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE," 60 FED. REG. 57165 (NOVEMBER 14, 1995).

59. "A MOVING CHALLENGE ON THE BORDER," WASHINGTON POST, MAY 26, 1995 AT A3.

60. "INTENSIVE U.S. BORDER EFFORT CALLED A SUCCESS, BUT SOME DISAGREE," DALLAS MORNING NEWS, SEPTEMBER 29, 1995.

61. "IT’S ‘GATE OPENER’ IN EAST COUNTY," SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, OCTOBER 3, 1995.

62. ID.

63. ID.

64. "GAO-BORDER PATROL," INTERPRETER RELEASES, MAY 6, 1991 AT 535.

65. LEE AT 527, N.40.

66. JUFFRAS AT 91.

67. "INS OFFICIALS HIGHLIGHT REFORMS IN ASYLUM, REDUCTION IN FRAUD," WASHINGTON POST, JANUARY 5, 1996 AT A2.

68. SEE D. SUTHERLAND, "COMPUTER REGISTRY TO FIGHT ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION: BAD NEWS FOR EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYEES," ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE INSTITUTION (APRIL 1995). SEE ALSO, J. MILLER AND S. MOORE, "A NATIONAL ID SYSTEM: BIG BROTHER’S SOLUTION TO ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION," CATO INSTITUTE (SEPTEMBER 7, 1995).

69. WASHINGTON POST, FEBRUARY 2, 1995.

70. LEE AT 527.

71. NEW YORK TIMES, SEPTEMBER 11, 1995 AT A24.

72. NEW YORK TIMES, SEPTEMBER 13, 1995 AT B9.

73. NEW YORK TIMES, SEPTEMBER 11, 1995 AT A24.

74. ID.

75. ID.

76. ID.

77. "CUSTOMS SERVICE AND INS: DUAL MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE FOR BORDER INSPECTIONS SHOULD BE ENDED," GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE AT 1 (JUNE 1993)(HEREAFTER, "GAO, CUSTOMS SERVICE AND INS").

78. ID. AT 2.

79. ID. AT 7.

80. ID. AT 9.

81. ID. AT 4-5, 8.

82. ID. AT 9.

83. INTERVIEW WITH AUTHOR, JANUARY 17, 1996.

84. GAO, CUSTOMS SERVICE AND INS, AT 17-18.

85. "WHOM SHALL WE WELCOME," REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION AT 134 (1953).

86. ID.

87. TESTIMONY OF DR. DEMETRIOS G. PAPADEMETRIOU, REPRINTED IN "COMMENTARY: PUTTING IMMIGRATION REFORM IN CONTEXT," IMMIGRATION LAW REPORT, OCTOBER 15, 1995 AT 248.

88. NEW YORK TIMES, SEPTEMBER 11, 1994 AT A24.

89. QUOTED IN, "REGO NO GO," WILLIAM D. EGGERS AND JOHN O’LEARY, REASON, APRIL 1994 AT 52.

90. "ACCEPTING THE IMMIGRATION CHALLENGE: THE PRESIDENT’S REPORT ON IMMIGRATION," THE WHITE HOUSE, AT VII (1994).

91. JAMES H. WALSH, "LESS THAN MEETS THE EYE AT INS," THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, SUMMER 1995 AT 301.

92. TESTIMONY OF CHRIS SALE, REPRINTED IN "HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE HOLDS INS OVERSIGHT HEARING," IMMIGRATION LAW REPORT, MARCH 1, 1995 AT 62.

93. "INS TAKES IT ON THE CHIN AT WIDE-RANGING HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING," INTERPRETER RELEASES APRIL 10, 1995 AT 495.

94. ID.

95. INTERVIEW WITH AUTHOR, JANUARY 5, 1996.

96. INTERVIEW WITH AUTHOR, JANUARY 4, 1996.

97. NEW YORK TIMES, SEPTEMBER 15, 1994, AT A18.

98. MILTON D. MORRIS, IMMIGRATION — THE BELEAGUERED BUREAUCRACY, AT 140 (BROOKINGS 1985).

99. ASCENCIO COMMISSION AT 31.

100. INTERVIEW WITH AUTHOR, JANUARY 5, 1996.

101. ASCENCIO COMMISSION AT 31.

102. TRUMAN COMMISSION AT 135.

103. ASCENCIO COMMISSION AT 30.

104. NEW YORK TIMES, SEPTEMBER 11, 1994 AT A1.

105. ASCENCIO COMMISSION AT 2.

106. POLICY-MAKERS SHOULD TAKE NOTE OF SEVERAL ALTERNATIVES TO THIS PROPOSAL. IN 1993, THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE RECOMMENDED THAT ALTHOUGH THERE WERE SEVERAL VIABLE PROPOSALS FOR REFORM, IT FAVORED MERGING ALL OF THE INS AND ALL OF THE CUSTOMS SERVICE INTO A SINGLE AGENCY. SEE GAO: CUSTOMS SERVICE AND INS AT 12-16. THE NEW BORDER MANAGEMENT AGENCY WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ISSUES. A "FORMER SENIOR CUSTOMS OFFICIAL" RECENTLY RECOMMENDED AN EVEN MORE DRAMATIC APPROACH: "[T]O STOP TURF WARS, SAYS ONE FORMER SENIOR CUSTOMS OFFICIAL, THE BRANCHES OF THE AGENCIES THAT POLICE THE BORDER — CUSTOMS, INS, DEA, FBI AND EVEN AGRICULTURE — SHOULD BE MERGED INTO A SINGLE DEPARTMENT THAT DEALS EXCLUSIVELY WITH BORDER SECURITY." TREVOR ARMBRISTER, "OUR DRUG-PLAGUED MEXICAN BORDER," READER’S DIGEST, JANUARY 1996 AT 58. A FINAL ALTERNATIVE IS LESS COMPREHENSIVE BUT PERHAPS MORE POLITICALLY FEASIBLE: MERGE ALL OF INS’S ENFORCEMENT FUNCTIONS AND HOUSE IT AS A SUBDIVISION OF THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT (SIMILAR TO THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW).

107. FEB. 16, 1993 LETTER FROM MICHAEL LANE, ACTING COMMISSIONER OF THE CUSTOMS SERVICE, TO THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO: CUSTOMS SERVICE AND INS AT 27; MARCH 29, 1993 LETTER FROM ROBERT M. TOBIAS, NATIONAL PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL TREASURY EMPLOYEES UNION, TO THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO: CUSTOMS SERVICE AND INS AT 40-46.

108. MARCH 29, 1993 LETTER FROM ROBERT TOBIAS, NTEU, TO GAO, GAO: CUSTOMS SERVICE AND INS AT 45.

109. ID. AT 44.

110. INTERVIEW WITH AUTHOR, JANUARY 17, 1996.

111. JOHN O’LEARY AND WILLIAM EGGERS, REVOLUTION AT THE ROOTS AT 99 (FREE PRESS, 1995).